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What you need to know, not what you want to hear
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at the Hearing ‘Has Merida Evolved? Part One: The Evolution of Drug Cartels and the
Threat to Mexico’s Governance.’”
13 September 2011
Dr. Robert J. Bunker ©
Senior Fellow
Small Wars Journal El Centro
http://www.smallwarsjournal.com
We need this basic premise to be clear—that Mexico is facing something way
beyond an organized crime threat. With this as the premise from which it starts, this
congressional testimony will posit that the Mérida Initiative as it stands is too myopic
in nature given the on-the-ground realities currently present in Mexico. These two
contentions will herein be discussed in more detail and their merits supported by
evidence from my own work and that of other area and subject specialists. Of necessity,
therefore, the testimony will focus upon the broader security environment and the policy
and strategic levels of analysis. It integrates writings that I have done previously, both on
my own and in collaboration with my colleague John Sullivan and others on this topic.
The analysis is divided into two sections addressing, first, the narco (criminal) threat and,
then, governmental policies. Each section, in turn, is divided into two main themes. The
themes covered in this testimony are as follows:
Narco (Criminal) Threat
• Increasing cartel and gang evolution towards ‘new warmaking’ entities
• The rise of criminal (& spiritual) insurgencies—societal warfare— in Mexico
Governmental Policies
• An ongoing cycle of countermoves and unintended consequences (second order
effects) stemming from our own and allied governmental policies
• The myopic nature of the Mérida Initiative vs the need for a Western
Hemispheric Strategy against cartels and gangs
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The testifier’s intent by selecting these themes is to better inform the members
and staff of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
concerning the Mérida Initiative within the context of the present security environment in
Mexico and to some extent in other Central American states of concern. For some
Subcommittee members and staff, this testimony might end up being ‘what you need to
know, not what you want to hear.’

The Narco (Criminal) Threat
Increasing cartel and gang evolution towards ‘new warmaking’ entities
In many ways, aspects of this testimony are extremely unpleasant since the
security environment in Mexico has become so barbarized. We are now witnessing
horrendous crimes against humanity undertaken by the cartels and gangs not only against
each other but against Mexican governmentl agencies throughout that nation from the
local through Federal level and against the public, including innocent children. Over
40,000 individuals have now been killed in this conflict in Mexico alone over the last
four-and-a-half years with tens-of-thousands more killed throughout Central America,
primarily from the gang warfare and street crime endemic to some locales. In reaction to
a series of seemingly endless twitter and social-media feeds graphically describing
unfolding events in Mexico which we witnessed on a particular occasion, my colleague
John P. Sullivan and I recently described the imagery as follows:
If Dante had been our contemporary, we fear he could just have easily
have taken a stroll through some of the cities and towns of Mexico and,
using those news feeds, could have substituted the imagery for the circles
of hell he described in his early 14th century work the D
 ivine Comedy.1 
The primary intent of this testimony is not to forensically dissect the Hobbesian
reality on the ground in many regions of Mexico but it must be acknowledged up front in
this testimony that torture and beheadings are an everyday occurrence in this conflict,
going well beyond the endemic quick and dirty assassinations or engagements between
rival cartel/gang forces or between cartel commandos and Mexican police or military
forces. For over a decade, ongoing research has been taking place contending that some
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street gangs and drug cartels are evolving and, essentially, becoming more sophisticated
and deadly organizations as they do so. This research has been published in both
academic journals and professional (law enforcement and military focused) publications
and is a component of broader future war and conflict research. The main forms of this
research are focused on 3rd Generation Gangs (3GEN Gangs), initially conceived by John
Sullivan in 1997, and Third Phase Cartels, initially conceived by Robert Bunker and John
Sullivan in 1998, in the journal Transnational Organized Crime. Other scholars,
including Max Manwaring— US Army War College, have extended this research as it
pertains to gang generations. Basic overviews of the earlier research model typologies
quoted from a forthcoming essay are:
The 3rd generation model— using politicization, internationalization, and
sophistication criteria— views the evolution of these gangs as follows:
• Turf: First Generation Gangs are traditional street gangs with a turf
orientation. Operating at the lower end of extreme societal violence, they
have loose leadership and focus their attention on turf protection and gang
loyalty within their immediate environs (often a few blocks or a
neighborhood). When they engage in criminal enterprise, it is largely
opportunistic and local in scope. These turf gangs are limited in political
scope and sophistication.
• Market: Second Generation Gangs are engaged in business. They are
entrepreneurial and drug-centered. They protect their markets and use
violence to control their competition. They have a broader, marketfocused, sometimes overtly political agenda and operate in a broader
spatial or geographic area. Their operations sometimes involve multi-state
and even international arenas. Their tendency for centralized leadership
and sophisticated operations for market protection places them in the
center of the range of politicization, internationalization, and
sophistication.
• Mercenary/Political: Third Generation Gangs have evolved political
aims. They operate—or seek to operate—at the global end of the
spectrum, using their sophistication to garner power, aid financial
acquisition, and engage in mercenary-type activities. To date, most third
generation (3 GEN) gangs have been primarily mercenary in orientation;
yet, in some cases they have sought to further their own political and
social objectives. A shift from simple market protection to power
acquisition is characteristic of third generation activity. A key indicator of
gang evolution is internationalization. Transnational gangs in Los Angeles
and on the border have been notable in this regard…Third generation
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gangs can be considered netwarriors and networked organizational forms
contribute to the rise of non-state or criminal-soldiers.[18 org]
The third phase cartel model—using a number of metrics including
organizational form, type of violence/corruption utilized, level of public
profiting, product range, technology use, and mercenary use— describes
the evolution of these cartels as follows:
• 1st Phase Cartel (Aggressive Competitor): The first phase cartel form
originated in Colombia during the 1980s and arose as an outcome of
increasing US cocaine demand. This type of cartel, characterized by the
Medellín model, realized economies of scale not known to the individual
cocaine entrepreneurs of the mid-1970s. This early cartel was an
aggressive competitor to the Westphalian state because of its propensity
for extreme violence and willingness to directly challenge the authority of
the state. The Medellín model, pioneered by Pablo Escabar, was
hierarchical and revolved around Escobar as the kingpin…In retrospect,
the Medellín model represented a very successful, albeit short lived, form
of criminal entity…Their attempt at directly taking on a Westphalian state,
politically and militarily, was both organizationally and individually
suicidal as witnessed by the successful decapitation of the top Medellín
leadership ranks by governmental forces in the early 1990s. Against the
resources and legitimacy of the Colombian state, this emerging netwarrior
ultimately was crushed.
• 2nd Phase Cartel (Subtle Co-Opter): The second phase cartel form also
originally developed in Colombia, but in this instance is centered in the
city of Cali. Unlike their Medellín counterparts, the Cali cartel was a
shadowy organization and the actual kingpins remained as anonymous as
possible. Its organization was more distributed and network based, relying
on terrorist-like cell structures, rather than being hierarchical. Many of its
characteristics and activities were dispersed and stealth-masked, which
yielded many operational capabilities not possessed by the first phase
cartel form. Specifically, it possessed leadership clusters that are more
difficult to identify and target with a decapitation attack…This cartel form
has also spread to Mexico with the rise of the Mexican Federation, an
alliance of the “big four” mafias based in Tijuana, Sonora, Juárez, and the
Gulf.
• 3rd Phase Cartel (Criminal State Successor): Third phase cartels, if and
when they emerge, have the potential to pose a significant challenge to the
modern nation-state and its institutions. A Third Phase Cartel is a
consequence of unremitting corruption and co-option of state institutions.
While this “criminal state successor” has yet to emerge, warning signs of
its eventual arrival are present in many states worldwide. Of current
importance to the United States are the conditions favoring narco- or
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criminal-state evolution in Mexico. Indeed, the criminal insurgency in
Mexico could prove to be the genesis of a true third phase cartel, as
Mexican cartels battle among themselves and the state for dominance.
Essentially, third phase cartels rule parallel polities or criminal enclaves,
acting much like warlords.[19 org]
Non-state threat groups, such as Los Zetas and La Familia Michoacana,
have made for an interesting hybrid case as they have attributes
representative of both 3rd generation gangs and 2nd phase cartels, with
evolving 3rd phase cartel attributes, that include emergence of forms of
spirituality and governance that compete with traditional Mexican state
values and political structures.2
It should also be noted at this point that, in the case of the Mexican cartels, these
organizations are no longer just narcotics or drug revenue focused. They have evolved to
the point that any form of criminality goes as long an illicit market exists for it. If the
cartels or gangs can profit from the body part trade or human trafficking (for labor or
sexual exploitation), they are increasingly likely to do so. This is especially true for a
group such as Los Zetas. Forcing slave laborers to dig drug tunnels and then killing them
afterward is not unheard of. As a result, very few people discuss the threat posed by
‘Mexican drug cartels.’ [Note: Even though the bulk of cartel revenue still comes from
the sales of illicit narcotics, the term ‘Mexican cartels’ is used due to the polygot nature
of these criminal organizations.]
At some point in the recent past, the Mexican cartels (and some gangs) crossed a
‘firebreak’ between our perceptions of what is ‘organized crime’ or even ‘transnational
organized crime’— a criminal threat and law enforcement concern—and what is
‘insurgency’ —a military threat and national security/military concern (though law
enforcement plays a partnership role with the military in responding to such a threat).
Essentially, we are seeing criminal organizations in Mexico morph into new warmaking
organizations. The problem we find ourselves with is that, since the academic
disciplines studying these subjects are relatively mature, their prevailing wisdom holds
that existing constructs can explain every phenomenon with many disciplines unable or
unwilling to recognize that certain phenomena are evolving past what a single discipline
can explain or understand. Take, for example, the existing gang and organized crime
literature on the security environment in Mexico. Its prevailing perceptual lens dictates
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that street gangs engage in petty street crime and that organized criminals engage in
organized crime and, therefore, it may fail to recognize important linkages between the
two. With due respect to the many esteemed scholars in that area, it is but one of many
such disciplines that are stovepiped in structure and thus alone cannot comprehend the
true nature of the problem faced by Mexico today.
Rather we must take a multidisciplinary approach and look at other disciplines
and analytical tools that we can draw upon to better understand what is taking place in
Mexico. In this instance, I have found it fruitful to draw upon the warmaking and
statemaking literature that exists. In regard to cartel and gang evolution, the following
short excerpt from the essay quoted previously highlights Vanda Felbab-Brown’s current
thinking concerning competition in state-making and then ties it back to Charles Tilly’s
earlier groundbreaking work:
It is thus important to stop thinking about crime solely as aberrant social
activity to be suppressed, but instead think of crime as a competition in
state-making. In strong states that effectively address the needs of their
societies, the non-state entities cannot outcompete the state. But in areas of
socio-political marginalization and poverty— in many Latin American
countries, conditions of easily upward of a third of the population—
nonstate entities do often outcompete the state and secure the allegiance of
large segments of society.[21 org]
Implicit in this line of reasoning, though unstated, are parallels to the
work of Charles Tilly concerning ‘Warmaking and Statemaking as
Organized Crime’ published in 1985. The agents of states that engage in
organized violence focus primarily on four activities:
1. War making: Eliminating or neutralizing their own rivals outside the
territories in which they have clear and continuous priority as wielders
of force.
2. State making: Eliminating or neutralizing their rivals inside those
territories.
3. Protection: Eliminating or neutralizing the enemies of their clients.
4. Extraction: Acquiring the means of carrying out the first three
activities—war making, state making, and protection.[22 org]
Historical parallels and lessons learned suggest that early European
dynastic states were ruled by leaders, such as Brandenburg under the
Hohenzollern warlords of the 15th century, whose initial activities to secure
wealth and power, and their later gaining of political legitimacy due to the
passing of time in which they possessed lands and resources, were little
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different in character than contemporaries personages such as the late
Pablo Escobar (Medellin Cartel) and Joaquin ‘El Chapo’ Guzman (Sinaloa
Cartel). The Americas are now witnessing the painful birth of new protostates, branded anathema by the established order, much in the same
manner as Europe did as it transitioned from the Medieval to the early
Modern era.3
Something very old historically, and at the same time very new, is thus taking
place in Mexico. To use a biological metaphor, we are winessing ‘cancerous
organizational tumors’ forming in Mexico both on its encompassing government and its
society at large. These tumors have their roots intertwined throughout that nation and,
while initially they were symbiotic in nature (like traditional organized crime
organizations), they have mutated to the point that they are slowly killing the host and
replacing it with something far different. These criminalized tumors draw their
nourishment from an increasingly diverse illicit economy that is growing out of
proportion to the limited legitimate revenues sustaining the Mexican state. These tumors
do not bode well for the health of Mexico or any of its neighboring states.
The rise of criminal (& spiritual) insurgencies—societal warfare— in Mexico
The preceding theme discussed gang and cartel evolution and the eventual rise of
new warmaking entities. Al Qaeda is a perfect example of another such entity.
Americans have yet to realize that, while Al Quaeda was the first to rise, others are now
following. In fact, the 9/11 attack is viewed as both a criminal act and an act of
war—utterly confounding for modern states to easily pigeonhole within the context of
international law. The US and its allies went to war against Al Qaeda and its allies and
are still locked in that global struggle ten years later. Ultimately, the emergence of Al
Qaeda, along with many other triggers, has helped to turn our understanding of the nature
of war on its head and is forcing security scholars to ask many difficult questions. As
these questions get asked (e.g. Can only states engage in war?) , anomalies arise in the
security environment triggering more questions (e.g. Why have mercenary armies come
back to the battlefield?).
It has been proposed for over two decades now by an increasing body of security
scholars (including Martin van Creveld and the 4th Generation and Fourth Epoch

7

theorists) that the traditional understanding and parameters which define what we call
“war” are rapidly becoming obsolete. While they may more or less accurately describe
the war presently waged between modern states, they cannot account for the rise of war
directed by non-state entities against modern states. Our understanding of this new and
developing form of warfare is still somewhat limited.
It has, however, resulted in questions pertaining to the very nature of insurgency
being raised. In a forthcoming edited work, my colleague John Sullivan and I contribute
an essay discussing the changing nature of insurgency and how scholarly perceptions
have been maturing. That essay will be only paraphrased briefly here but its introduction
sets the stage for the context within which new forms of insurgency emerge:
The shift of government authority from the state to “para-states” (aka,
non-state actors/non-state armed groups or criminal netwarriors) is a
consequence of globalization, networked organization, and the
exploitation of regional economic circuits to create a new base of power.
These new power configurations may result in the decline of the state and
new forms of sovereignty/new state forms. As such, criminal gangs and
cartels would be acting as new state-making entities.[6 org] These networked
cartels and gangs are challenging the existing power structure(s). Their
challenge involves the impact of high levels of violence, barbarism,
attacks on journalists,[7 org] police, and mayors, the use of information
operations[8 org] and, increasingly, the use of what we call
social/environmental modification. Social/environmental modification
includes the instrumental use of narcocultura, including religious cults or
spiritual symbolism, to secure legitimacy, justify atrocity, and form social
cohesion (in effect, combat power) among criminal soldiers. No longer is
insurgency viewed from a purely political or ideological lens; it now has
post-modern implications.[9 org]4
Mexico can be considered an initial archetype for two forms of insurgency that
were once—as far back as the early 1990s— something just theorized. The first is known
as ‘criminal insurgency’ (then known as ‘commercial insurgency’) and the second is
known as ‘spiritual insurgency’. Steven Metz, US Army War College, in The Future of
Insurgency in December 1993 provided much of the conceptual basis of these forms of
insurgency. Stephen Sloan, W.G. Thom, and Ralph Peters all contributed early on to the
thinking concerning criminal insurgency with John P. Sullivan becoming in 2008 the first
scholar to fully articulate the criminal insurgency construct and broadly promote its
usage:
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Criminal insurgencies are the result of criminal enterprises competing
with the state. Their competition is not for traditional political
participation within state structures, but rather to free themselves from
state control so they can maximize profits from illicit economic circuits.
As defined by Sullivan, criminal insurgencies can exist at several levels:[28 org]
•

Local Insurgencies: First, criminal insurgencies may exist as ‘local
insurgencies’ in a single neighborhood or ‘failed community’ where gangs
dominate local turf and political, economic and social life. These areas
may be ‘no-go zones’ avoided by the police. The criminal enterprise
collects taxes and exercises a near-monopoly on violence. A large segment
of the extreme violence in Mexico is the result of ‘local insurgencies.’
Municipalities like Ciudad Juárez or portions of some states, like
Michoacán, are under siege. The cartels and other gangs dominate these
areas by a careful combination of symbolic violence, attacks on the police,
corruption, and fostering a perception that they are community protectors
(i.e., ‘social bandits’). Here the criminal gang is seeking to develop a
criminal enclave or criminal free-state. Since the nominal state is never
fully supplanted, development of a parallel state is the goal. In a federal
state, the erosion of control at sub-state levels (municipalities, states or
provinces) can marginalize the capacity of the federal entity and create
zones of impunity which enhance criminal capacity in other polities.

•

Battle for the Parallel State: Second, criminal insurgencies may be battles
for control of the ‘parallel state.’ These occur within the parallel state’s
governance space, but also spill over to affect the public at large and the
police and military forces that seek to contain the violence and curb the
erosion of governmental legitimacy and solvency that results. In this case,
the gangs or cartels battle each other for domination or control of the
criminal enclave or criminal enterprise. The battle between cartels and
their enforcer gangs to dominate the ‘plazas’ is an insurgency where one
cartel seeks to replace the other in the parallel state.

•

Combating the State: Third, criminal insurgencies may result when the
criminal enterprise directly engages the state itself to secure or sustain its
independent range of action. This occurs when the state cracks down and
takes action to dismantle or contain the criminal gang or cartel. In this
case, the cartel attacks back. This is the situation seen in Michoacán
where La Familia retaliated against the Mexican military and intelligence
services in their July 2009 counterattacks, and the July 2011 battles
between Los Cabelleros Templar against state forces. Here the cartels are
active belligerents against the state.

•

The State Implodes: Fourth, criminal insurgency may result when high
intensity criminal violence spirals out of control. Essentially this would be
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the cumulative effect of sustained, unchecked criminal violence and
criminal subversion of state legitimacy through endemic corruption and
co-option. Here the state simply loses the capacity to respond. This
variant has not occurred in Mexico or Central America yet, but is arguably
the situation in Guinea-Bissau where criminal entities have transitioned
the state into a virtual narco-state. This could occur in other fragile zones
if cartel and gang violence is left to fester and grow.5
Sullivan has since been actively developing this line of research with some co-writers, the
earliest being Adam Elkus, and later this author. Additionally, Bob Killebrew, Jennifer
Bernal, Tom Ricks, Juan Castillo, and Hal Brands have also all touched upon this concept
in one manner or another. Steven Metz has also revisited the original commercial
insurgency construct but his new work articulated in a 2010 conference paper has not
been released.
Spiritual insurgency, also originally theorized by Steven Metz, has witnessed less
development over the years than his economic based one, but this has significantly
changed in the last few years given the darkening situation in Mexico. While Pauletta
Otis also wrote on religion and violence for years, it was not until 2009 that Matthew
Lauder resurrected the actual construct. Pamela Bunker, Lisa Campbell, and Robert
Bunker then wrote on this topic in various combinations in 2010. Their works:
...raised concerns over a real cultural shift in Mexico to a ‘narcocultura’
stemming from societal corruption via the drug cartels and drug culture.
Such a cultural shift, it was feared, would result in a spirituality that
included a belief in ‘supernatural forms of protection’ and ‘their own
higher morality’ by those engaging in narcotics trafficking and
concomitant and heinous acts such as torture and beheading.6
and that
this insurgency [in Mexico] has at its basis a spiritual, if not religious,
component that threatens the underlying foundations of our modern
Western value system.7
Sullivan was later brought into these writings in 2011 and both forms of
insurgency—criminal and spiritual— started to become integrated. Metz did not
foresee this possibility in his earlier work but times have since radically changed.
These two forms of insurgency when blended together, as we are seeing happen in
Mexico, also make a strong case for the perception that societal warfare is now taking
10

place within that nation. The more advanced cartels and gangs, representative of new
warmaking entities, are utilizing environmental modification to change the institutions
and structures of Mexican government and society and, in the process, create their own
vision of what the human condition and relationships should be. This is much like a street
gang—if viewed as a cancerous form of deviant and criminal values— changing a street
over time to mirror its own system of twisted norms and codes of behavior wherein
graffiti marks the turf, the strong prey on the weak, public spaces such as street corners
are taken over, and young girls are viewed as gang property. This process in Mexico is
taking place writ large with the rise of a narcocultura. We are seeing the glorification of
narco-violence, narco-corruption, narco-songs, narco-mansions, and narco-saints. Where
this process is most pronounced is in the territories held by the La Familia cartel, though
the Mexican government has been severely targeting its leadership due to the recognition
of the extreme threat it represents. Various forms of narcocultura permeate all cartel held
territories, even the more secular Sinaloa cartel with its more benign Jesus Malverde
spirituality.
Thus, what can be considered more restrained Mexican society is now in a battle
for the hearts, minds, and souls of its citizens against a new and deviant form of Mexican
society that is on the rise. Ultimately, the bonds and relationships that hold the Mexican
government, its people, and the military/police of the state together are under siege by the
criminal and spiritual insurgencies taking place. If that were not enough, those cartel and
gang insurgent groups have built up parallel narco bonds and relationships to solidify the
rise of shadow states within Mexico. They have the money and the coercive power to
sustain such a strategy. This results in dual sovereignty arising along with varying
mixtures of legitimate and illegitimate structures in the hundreds of ‘zones of impunity’
found across Mexico. No one in these locales know who to trust. Many persons assume
dual roles, seeming to representing the Federal government on the one hand and the cartel
presently holding local power on the other. Narco (criminal) cities are emerging in
Mexico with Nuevo Laredo the largest and most pronounced. In cities not as far gone
such as Ciudad Juárez, anarchy reigns with tens of thousands of homes now left vacant
and as many as 200,000 people having fled that city.
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Warlordism, advanced forms of social banditry, cult-like behaviors, the pervasive
use of the bribe (silver) and the threat (lead), and the use of child soldiers have also arisen
and blended in such locales. The end result at minimum is a laundry list of horrors related
to targeted killings, torture sessions, and beheadings carried out in a secular ‘it’s only
business’ manner taking place. Somewhere in the middle, we are seeing the use of
fragmentation grenades and car bombs (so far limited), arson to burn out neighborhoods,
improvised armored fighting vehicles, and heavier infantry combat weaponry (rocket
propelled grenades, anti-tank rockets and .50 cal sniper rifles). At the extreme end of this
process, we can now add in sadistic (pleasure killing) and human sacrifice (ritualized
killing) taking place. Should these be thought to be an exaggeration, some of the
numerous examples of these activities now taking place include:
• The stacking of headless bodies and the staged placement of body parts.
• The staging of a skinned skull resting on severed arms with the victim‘s male
genitalia held in the palm of one of their hands.
• Decapitated heads left at the tombs of deceased drug lords—implicated as Santa
Muerte worshipers— as sacrificial offerings.
• Decapitated heads offered directly to Santa Muerte by her worshipers.
• Victims killed at Santa Muerte altars/shrines.
• The ritual burning of decapitated heads as offerings.
• The removal of the hearts of victims.
• The skinning of victims while alive.
• The castration and then decapitation of victims while alive.
• The desecration of at least one shrine belonging to a more benign Saint with the
body parts of the victims strew over it and their heads line up on the roof.
• The use of black candle magic to request that the deity kill one’s enemies. 
• The threatening of a kidnap victim at a Santa Muerte altar with divine wrath if 
they failed to cooperate with their captors. 
• The alleged smoking of a victim’s ashes mixed with cocaine in a ‘smoking
death’ ritual.
• The likely rise of cannibalistic rituals during cartel-led ‘spiritual’ retreats. [8org] 8
While they are unfortunately necessarily graphic, these examples clearly show that
something dark and sinister is taking place within the broader security environment.
Mexico even has Los Caballeros Templarios (“The Knights Templar”) and
Manos con ojos (“Hands with Eyes”) now deploying fighters on the battlefield. These
groups, breakaways from the La Familia and Beltrán Leyva cartels, are extremely violent
and, in the case of the Templarios, have the very real potential of carrying out future
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suicide (martyrdom) attacks for god and cartel. I never thought we would contemplate the
day when ‘true believers’ from a Mexican cartel would start looking a lot like jihadists
fighting for Al Qaeda—instead representing a perverted form of Christianity—but such a
day appears very close at hand.
For whatever reason, however, unwillingness still exists by many to call what is
taking place in Mexico what it is. Because the insurgencies taking place do not look like
traditional Maoist insurgencies, many scholars have summarily discounted them as
insurgencies at all. Further, a fight against “organized crime,” as many attempt to label
the conflict waging in Mexico, is a politically expedient strategy that benefits the
Calderon administration and a term that is less unnerving to an increasingly threatened
and demoralized citizenry. It is understandable that the Calderon administration has
simply called the cartels and gangs ‘organized criminals’ since it denies them any form of
legitimacy. After the recent casino torching and mass murder in Monterrey, his shift to
characterizing the perpetrators as ‘terrorists’, though the rhetoric was quickly
downplayed, is also understandable due to the horrific nature of the act. Despite the
“criminal” label, which would imply a law enforcement response, President Calderon
nonetheless introduced ground troops into this conflict with the cartels in December 2006
shortly after his inauguration because Mexico was beginning to lose control over parts of
its sovereign territories. Organized criminals represent a law enforcement issue and do
not seize control of states, however, insurgents and criminal-soldiers do and this is the
reality of what we are witnessing in Mexico. Such seizure of the reigns of power— albeit
in the shadows—can take place both purposefully and accidentally but results in the same
end state of de facto political control. With the achievement of economic (loads of
narcotics money) and military (standing armies of gunmen) power comes the eventual
attainment of political power, plain and simple.
It is thus imperative that US Congressional members and their staffs accurately
understand the threat Mexico, and some of the Central American states, face. Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton in September 2010 alluded to an insurgency in Mexico taking
place (it kind of looks like Colombia…) as did Undersecretary of the Army Joseph
Westphal in February 2011 who actually said it was the case. Both utterances of the “I”
word were quickly retracted and apologies made. While the Calderon administration
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would prefer that we did not start using the “I” word openly I think we owe it both to the
American and Mexican peoples to call it what it is. Failure to properly define what is
taking place means that both this threat and its severity will be misdiagnosed and, as a
result, the policies enacted to respond to it will be inappropriate and ineffective and
Mexico and its allies will spend countless amounts of precious funding on useless
mitigating measures.
Still, once we do accept that criminal and spiritual insurgencies are now taking
place in Mexico— and even the beginnings of societal warfare between traditional values
and narcocultra (an ideological component of the new warkmaking entities)— great
problems still exist in regard to past governmental policies enacted. Not only do we have
to get the threat right but we also have to get the policies right too. As is covered in the
next section, so far this has proved to be a major impediment stretching back decades
within the broader cartel and gang threat and illicit narcotics market that exists.

Governmental Policies
An ongoing cycle of countermoves and unintended consequences (second order effects)
stemming from our own and allied governmental policies
In creating policies to mitigate and suppress the cartel, gang, and narcotics threat,
an ongoing ‘policy spoiler’ effect has taken place representative of an inhibiting actionreaction dynamic. For every move the US and other governments (e.g. Mexico), have
made either intentional countermoves and/or unintended consequences (second order
effects) have come about. Seven examples of this policy spoiler effect occuring over the
course of several decades have been highlighted and are illustrative of what has been
taking place:
• 1970-1990: The US victory in the maritime drug war centered in the
Gulf/Caribbean resulted in overland (and air and border tunnel) routes through
Mexico into the United States becoming dominant. The unintended second order
effect was to strengthen the position of the illicit narcotics smugglers (pre-cartel
formation) in Mexico.
• 1985-1989: The DEA response (Operation Leyenda) to the death of Enrique
‘Kiki’ Camarena at the hands of Mexican traffickers resulted in ‘El Padrino’ Felix
Gallardo in 1987 establishing the plaza system as an intentional defensive
countermove. This countermove established the cartel system in Mexico, divided
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into the Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez, Sonora, Matamoros, and Sinaloa cartels and
operated by prominent trafficking families. Prior to that time, the “godfather”
was running an illicit business from which the PRI/other Mexican elites were
quietly profiting.9
• 1981-1996: Colombia was victorious (with US DEA/CIA/military aid) over the
Medellin and Cali Cartels. Over the course of this conflict, the power relationship
between the Colombian cartels and the new Mexican cartels shifted as the
Colombian cartels were eventually dismantled. The unintended second order
effect was solidifying the power of the new Mexican cartels.
• 1988: The US Congress enacted the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 and thereby
made illicit narcotics users accountable for their actions. Prior to this time, sellers
were the primary target of US enforcement operations. While some positive
benefits have resulted from this policy in that user % rates are down, the
unexpected second order effects are the filling of our nation’s federal and state
prisons with narcotics offenders (at great economic cost) and the US having
gained the dubious distinction of incarcerating more people than any other nation
in the world.
• Early through late 1990s: Central American and Mexican gang members living
illegally in Los Angeles belonging to Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and 18th Street
were deported back to their home countries, typically as teenagers. Getting rid of
these hardcore gang members helped to reduce crime in Los Angeles but resulted
in an unexpected second order effect. The maras established themselves in El
Salvador, Guatemala, other Central American countries, as well as in in Mexico
and their members now number in the tens-of-thousands. These gang members
and the new members that they recruited then immigrated to the US East Coast
and other parts of the United States further spreading the maras in the Western
Hemisphere.
• Late 1990s: The use of Mexican special forces to locate and apprehend cartel
members resulted in a countermove by the Gulf Cartel. Thirty-one of these elite
soldiers were fully corrupted and became the nucleus of the Zetas—initially the
enforcer arm of the Gulf Cartel and now an independent cartel in their own right.
This countermove resulted in the militarization of all the cartels in response to the
Zetas initial ‘battlefield’ dominance. The ensuing arms race is still taking place
with cartel use of heavier military weapons and, more recently, improvised
armored fighting vehicles (IAFVs). A side effect of this process has been to make
local and state Mexican police forces—those not already corrupted by the
cartels—totally outclassed in engagements with cartel enforcer and commando
units.
• December 2006-Present: Calderon has turned the Mexican military loose on the
cartels and, in essence, ‘declares war’. Numerous countermoves and second order
effects have taken place—understandable given that the cartels represent
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extremely violent, sentient, and formidable opposition forces. One notable
countermove by the cartels (primarily from the Zetas and Sinaloa) is their
seeking safe haven in Central America. This phenomena, coupled with the
growth of the maras in various Central American states, has resulted in a bottom
up gang and top down cartel assault on nations such as Guatemala, Honduras, and
El Salvador.
The existence of this continuing policy spoiler issue makes perfect sense in
hindsight given the intractability of the illicit narcotics market. When governmental
policies have been enacted, they are typically directed at only a component (in time,
geography and/or market sector) of the broader illicit narcotics market and non-state
entities associated with it. It is reminiscent of the ‘squishy balloon’ analogy wherein
a balloon when pushed will typically bulge in another area not undergoing immediate
pressure. Further, these governmental policies are generally not analytically ‘red-teamed’
or even gamed or analyzed to determine which countermoves and/or unintended
consequences (second order effects) could be projected as a likely outcome. The creation
of governmental policy thus exists in a ‘strategic vacuum’ and does not benefit from the
larger historical context of what has been taking place in the Western Hemisphere. Even
when a well thought out strategy is actually utilized, as in the case of maritime battle
against illicit narcotics coming through the Gulf/Caribbean region, it only pushes the
problem into unexpected areas or creates fundamentally new problems in its wake. The
rise of the Maras in Central America and Los Zetas in Mexico are but two examples of
the latter.
Decades of policy formulation and implementation in this arena, however wellintentioned, suggest that the complex and adaptive illicit markets and evolving threats
that we have been facing, on the whole, have not been severely challenged by our efforts.
While we can agree that Colombia is now better off than it was in the 1980s when
besieged by the Medellin and Cali cartels, that Miami is much quieter with Colombian
operatives no longer fighting for market share, and that African American gangs (such as
the Crips and Bloods) are no longer openly fighting in some of our inner cities over crack
distribution, instead we find that Mexico, a number of states in Central America
(including Honduras, Guatemala, and increasingly Belize), and the US Southern Border
are now imperiled. Certain areas, including entire cities, are no longer under the
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governance of Mexico and other Central American states and instead have become true
criminal cities, enclaves, and para-states. Additionally, the United States is now peppered
with Mexican cartel operatives and gang contractors (see Map 1):
Map 1. Situation Report: Cities in Which Mexican DTOs Operate Within the United States

National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), 11 April 2008,
www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs27/27986/appenda.htm#Map.
On balance, over the last 30 years, the strategic situation has not improved for the
better. Even if some of our urban streets presently appear safer, with illicit narcotics still
actively flowing into the US, Mexican cartel operatives and contractors embedded in
hundreds of our cities, and cartel and gang threat groups in many Latin American regions
flourishing and mutating quicker than US and local sovereign state public policy
processes can contend, the situation has actually degraded. Congress needs to recognize
this ongoing and much larger ‘policy spoiler’ issue that we contend with when
formulating our policies in this arena. High national debt levels and shrinking revenue
issues will likely only exacerbate the situation as our funding mandates for US security
policy implementation become increasingly constrained.
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The myopic nature of the Mérida Initiative vs the need for a Western Hemispheric
Strategy against cartels and gangs
Because of the inhibiting action-reaction ‘policy spoiler’ dynamic, derived from
either intentional countermoves and/or unintended consequences (second order effects)
identified previously, the Mérida Initiative which this hearing is focusing upon should be
considered—devoid of any link to a more encompassing strategy— too myopic in scope
to be of any lasting benefit in our response to the cartel/gang threats and illicit narcotics
market that we have been facing. A far more encompassing approach must be
undertaken. In an earlier Narcos Over the Border (Routledge 2011) work, this author
identified six trans-operational environments within which the US is now engaging the
cartels and gangs. An initial description of these environments from that work is as
follows:
US Engagement in Trans-Operational Environments
A component of the strategic threat that the Mexican cartels and
their associated mercenary and gang affiliates pose to the US is the
numerous operational environments in the Western Hemisphere in which
they are now being engaged. These six trans-operational environments can
be viewed in Table 4. These operational environments can be
characterized by the environment itself, the location of the physical threat,
the narco-opposing force (NARCO-OPFOR), a typology of the criminalcombatants engaged, and the US responding forces. The most basic
environment is that of crime taking place within the US. Local and state
law enforcement respond to the threats that exist in this environment—
threats which are basically low level street and prison gangs and
individual members of the Mexican cartels. The next environment type is
that of high intensity crime taking place in the US. This threat is derived
from more organized entities such as the Mexican cartels themselves and
actual drug trafficking gangs who have access to better weapons and
employ more sophisticated tactics. The responding forces are specialized
law enforcement units and task forces and federal law enforcement
agencies such as the DEA, FBI, and ATF.
The third operational environment is characterized by threats to US
homeland security. This is a new environment that has been created in
response to the 9-11 attacks and is focused on protecting the US from
threats of terrorism and insurgency taking place within its borders. The
primary responding forces are drawn from federal law enforcement
agencies and components of the still relatively new Department of
Homeland Security. Some specialized units created by the larger cities,
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especially New York and Los Angeles, will also be operating in this
environment though, from a support and consequence management
perspective, all levels of law enforcement and other responder groups will
also be involved. The next operational environment is homeland defense
support against terrorism and insurgency taking place on US soil. The
military corollary to homeland security with the operating environment
and response requirements also articulated since the 9-11 attacks. The
creation of US Northern Command and US Army North are integral
components of the federal military response with these entities presently
providing a stability and support and consequence management support
role due to Posse Comitatus.
The fifth operational environment is found in Mexico and Latin
America and pertains to foreign military support. Specifically the US
military is providing allied military forces, predominately the Colombian
and Mexican militaries, with the training, resources, and hardware
necessary to respond to the drug cartels who are waging campaigns of
narco-terrorism and narco-insurgency throughout large swaths of Latin
America. This response from the US side falls predominantly upon US
Northern Command and US Army North in regards to Mexico and US
Southern Command and US Special Forces in regards to Latin America.
The final operational environment is also primarily found in Mexico and
Latin America. It pertains to foreign law enforcement support to allied
nations facing what is generally considered to be an operational
environment challenged by cartel, mercenary, and gang generated high
intensity crime. Federal law enforcement agencies and specialized law
enforcement units, such as Los Angeles based gang task forces, are
principally involved in providing this foreign support.
Of concern with regard to the trans-operational environments the
US is engaging in is the lack of any form of comprehensive hemispheric
strategy coordinating these multiple efforts. Because the threats are
principally non-state, criminal, and more networked than hierarchical in
nature, they continue to defy US national security perceptions. This should
be somewhat of an amazing occurrence given the recent passing of the 8th
anniversary of 9-11 but ultimately it is not. The US response to the threats
posed by the Mexican (and Colombian) cartels and their mercenary and
gang associates is being responded to in a federally mandated ‘stove pipe’
manner. This is the process the US followed for decades during the Cold
War—though an overarching strategy existed— and ultimately yielded
victory over the Soviet Union. This same process is now being taken into
the 21st Century and applied to very different types of threats. In this new
conflict in the Americas, we are still very much in the opening rounds so
caution concerning the future is warranted. At the very minimum, the US
critically needs an organizing hemispheric strategy to be developed which
coordinates the current ‘stove pipe’ response.[39 org] More than likely,
however, given the fundamentally different nature of the new non-state
threats and opposing networks (the NARCO-OPFOR) developing in the
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Americas, a hemispheric strategy combined with a new process, drawing
upon network response capabilities, will be required to meet this new
challenge— a war this author views will be fought over humanity’s new
forms of social and political organization.10
Table 4. Six Trans-operational Environments

Another way of characterizing the more encompassing threat is derived
from viewing the Mexican cartel debate through five fields of security studies.
The author wrote an essay in February 2011 in Small Wars Journal addressing
this issue:
Divergent Fields of Security Studies
Five primary fields of security studies are presently engaged, to
one extent or another, in research and publication on the Mexican cartel
phenomena and on the threat that this phenomena poses to that country, to
the United States, and to other Western Hemispheric nations. Each field of
security study will be summarized and its major assumptions, concerns,
and authors  highlighted:[1 org]    
• Gang Studies: These studies fall primarily under the disciplines
of sociology and criminal  justice. Law enforcement practitioners in gang
units, such as Wes McBride (Sgt. LASD,  Ret), and university academics
have long dominated this field. This field focuses on  generic street and
drug gangs, prison gangs, geographically focused (e.g. New York, 
Chicago, Los Angeles) gangs, specialized ethnic (e.g. Hispanic, African
American) gangs  and gender (female) gangs. Gangs with more organized
structures— such as Asian and  Outlaw Motorcycle— also fall into this
field with some overlap into organized crime  studies.  The basic
20

assumption is that street, drug, and prison gangs engage in low intensity
crime activities and therefore they are a local law enforcement
problem—though regional and national gang investigators associations
have emerged for  information sharing and coordination purposes due to
the spread of these groups  throughout the United States...
• Organized Crime Studies: This field, which covers both domestic
and transnational (or  global) organized crime, draws normally upon the
disciplines of political science, history,  and criminal justice. Organized
criminal organizations and illicit economies are the center  focus of these
studies. It should be pointed out that the Mexican cartels are still drawing 
the bulk of their resources presently from illicit narcotics sales, but have
also branched  out into numerous other illicit endeavors including human
trafficking, kidnapping, and  street taxation. The basic assumption of this
field is that organized crime entities seek to  establish a parasitic (and
symbiotic) relationship with their host state(s) and simply obtain  freedom
of actions for their illicit activities. Such criminal entities are viewed as
solely  money making endeavors, are not politicized, and have no
intention of creating their own  shadow political structures or taking over
the reigns of governance. These studies view organized crime as the
purview of law enforcement with specialized units (i.e. FBI and  DEA task
forces) required to dismantle the more sophisticated and dangerous
criminal  organizations. The conflict environment is said to be that of
crime or organized crime  with the extreme operational environment now
found in Mexico being labeled as that of  ‘high intensity crime’… 
•  Terrorism Studies: This field of studies emerged out of the late
1960s— as urban guerillas  became politically motivated terrorists—with
initial terrorism courses taught in the midto-late 1970s in political science
and international relations departments. This field has  had its assumptions
shift from limited levels of violence utilized and the use of  kidnappings as
theater plays; hence “terrorists want lots of people watching not dead”[3 org]
to religiously motivated terrorists who seek to engage in killing on a mass
scale. The basic assumption is that terrorists, both politically and
religiously motivated, engage in  destructive attacks that generate -terror 
(a form of disruptive societal targeting) in order  to change governmental
policies. Further, terrorism is considered a technique that, when  utilized in
a revolutionary or insurgent setting, can help to create a shadow
government  and/or overthrow a government in power. Narco-terrorism
would be considered a  subfield of terrorism studies—though utilizing
terror to promote criminal objectives. To  date, many of the best and
brightest terrorism scholars— except for Brian Jenkins who  possesses
insurgency expertise from the Vietnam era— have not made an attempt to 
engage in this area of research as it pertains to the cartels in Mexico.
Depending on its severity and where it takes place, terrorism can be
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considered a law enforcement  problem, a homeland security problem,
and/or a military problem…   
• Insurgency Studies: These studies are politico-military based and
undertaken at think tanks, in some university departments, and at U.S.
military and governmental institutions...and get us into topical areas 
including revolutionary warfare, insurgency, guerrilla warfare, low
intensity conflict,  operations other than war, shadow governmental
structures, and a host of other terms for  this level of conflict and/or
techniques. Since terrorism is also common as an insurgency  technique,
some bleed over from this field to terrorism studies exists as do some
forays  into organized crime studies, due to the benefits illicit economies
provide to insurgents  (for example, we might ask where the Taliban
would be without its illicit narcotics  income). This field predates Mao
Zedong’s works of the late 1930s and has been  developing for over a halfcentury with key interest during the Vietnam era. The field is  especially
vibrant now with American involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan-Pakistan.
 Assumptions and concerns focus on political change and revolution, that
is, how groups  out of power in a country seize control of a government by
indirect and irregular means  not conventional military conquest.   The
latter may, however, be considered the final  phase of revolutionary
warfare so clearly the techniques used vary widely. Insurgency  itself, if
allowed to gain strength, is viewed as a national security threat to a state.
This  field of study is undergoing its own internal debate concerning the
primacy of political  based insurgency vs. broadening the definition of
insurgency to include other forms  derived from religion and/or
criminality. The threat posed by the Mexican cartels  encompasses this
internal debate and raises the question as to whether Mexico is or is not 
facing “criminal insurgencies”...
• Future Warfare Studies: The areas of military and strategic
studies, political science,  international relations, and military history (via
trend analysis) have all contributed to the  study of future warfare. This
form of study assumes that -modes of warfare  or -coherent  warfare
practices  exist and that warfare is continually evolving. Typically, this is 
attributed to the introduction of new forms of technology (such as the
stirrup or  gunpowder), an expansion of the battlespace into new temporal
and spatial dimensions  (such as the domain of cyberspace), or the rise of
new military organizational forms (such  as the legion or modern
divisional structure).  Multivariate explanations for the evolution of
warfare also readily exist in this field of study. The threat represented by
the Mexican cartels would therein be considered part of a modal warfare
shift. This shift would, at a minimum, elevate the threat the Mexican
cartels represent to that of a national security threat as the cartels would be
engaging in a new form of warfare against the Mexican state—though a
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number of scholars would argue such a threat transcends national security
and represents a threat to the nation-state form itself…11
The Mérida Initiative from a Western Hemispheric Strategy perspective currently
only exists in two trans-operational environments (primarily in Mexico via US military
and law enforcement foreign support—the 5th and 6th operational environments) and
mainly within only some of the security fields—probably only gangs and organized crime
and possibly terrorism to some extent. Mexican political authorities have fully rejected
the notion that a criminal insurgency is actually taking place in their country and the
conflict as an element of emergent forms of future warfare based on new warmaking
entities challenging the nation-state form is a totally alien concept to their present
thinking.
The Mérida Initiative as presently articulated is simply too myopic to do much
good by itself—it misses much of the bigger threat picture that exists. On its own, it will
only help to promote the ‘squishy balloon’ phenomena or result in additional cartel
countermoves and/or unintended consequences taking place. The Mérida Initiative
thus needs to evolve—or more accurately the Mérida Initiative, Plan Colombia, and
increasing levels of US aid to Central America (about $300 million in 2011) need to be
merged together into nucleus of a more encompassing Western Hemispheric Strategy.
That strategy, as this testifier argued in 2010, needs to be part of a new strategic
imperative for the United States which requires the realignment of our national threat
perceptions:
The drug cartels and narco-gangs of the Americas, with those in
Mexico of highest priority, must now be elevated to the #1 strategic threat
to the United States. While the threat posed by Al Qaeda, and radical
Islam is still significant, it must be downgraded presently to that of
secondary strategic importance. Europe, due to the threat derived from
changing demographics, larger numbers of citizens radicalized, and
proximity to Islamic states, many of which contain Islamist insurgent
forces, will continue to identify the threat of radical Islam as their #1
strategic imperative and should be allowed to take the opportunity to
share, if not take the strategic lead, in this important area of concern. The
recently heightened tensions in Europe with the threat of Mumbai style
attacks directed at a number of its capital cities are indicative of the
mandate which should now be provided to allied states such as Great
Britain, France, and Germany and that of the more encompassing
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European Union. The US must help defend the line in Europe against
terrorist attack, the imposition of Sharia law, and other threats to the social
organization of our allies such as the disenfranchisement of women, while
acknowledging for the immediate future, we have ignored for too long a
new type of threat which has arisen far closer to home.12
In sum, due to the evolution of cartels and gangs into new warmaking entities, the rise of
new forms of criminal and spiritual insurgencies promoting societal warfare, and the
ongoing cycle of countermoves and unintended consequences confounding our own and
allied governmental policies, the Mérida Initiative, and others like it directed at Colombia
and Central America, need to evolve to a more encompassing scope and scale and with a
greater sense of strategic urgency than most Congressional policy makers might a priori
think is necessary.
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